Ambush marketing: the Paris Judicial Court has recently ruled on two occasions regarding the commercial exploitation of sporting events:

Two decisions handed down in early 2026 illustrate how the Paris Judicial Court approaches different situations involving ambush marketing.

The first case concerns Manse International, the operator of the ‘Royaltiz’ platform, which allows users to invest, much like on the stock market, in the careers of sportspeople presented as ‘talents’. Ahead of the 2022 Six Nations Championship, Royaltiz launched a digital marketing campaign a few days before the start of the competition, announcing the arrival of several international players on its platform and inviting users to invest in these players, who were presented as likely to shine during the tournament.

Thus, between February and March 2022, the company intensified its social media activity, notably through posts, reposts of players or official accounts, as well as the promotion of articles illustrated with photographs of the French national rugby team. One of the posts, shared on LinkedIn, featured a photograph taken after the France v England match on 19 March 2022, accompanied by the slogan: “Royaltiz is the only platform in the world where you can invest in the best rugby players”.

Taking the view that this communication was timed to coincide with the competition schedule in order to capitalise on its reputation, the French Rugby Federation sued the company on the grounds of the exclusive right to exploit sporting events provided for in Article L.333-1 of the Sports Code, as well as unfair competition.

In a judgment of 6 January 2026, the Paris Judicial Court found a breach of the right to exploit sporting events, holding that the use, for promotional purposes, of a photograph from the France-England match constituted unauthorised commercial exploitation of the competition’s image.

Furthermore, regarding the issue of free-riding, the Court noted that Royaltiz had published 26 posts over a two-month period coinciding precisely with the Six Nations Championship, alternating between posts relating to the French national team and commercial promotion of its ‘tokens’ featuring international players. The repetition, regularity and alignment with the match schedule reveal a communication strategy aimed at capturing the attention of the public drawn to the competition and implicitly associating the platform with the event and the national team.

The Court further clarified that the act of sharing a message on a social media platform gives rise to liability on the part of the person disseminating it, regardless of whether they are the original author.

Although the FFR sought damages of over €280,000, the Court nevertheless dismissed the claim for compensation and merely ordered the removal of the disputed posts, subject to a penalty payment of €100 per day of delay for 90 days.

The second case concerns a ‘live shopping’ event organised by the company Printemps during the 2023 edition of the Roland-Garros tournament. On that occasion, Printemps posted a video entitled “Jeu, Set & Match” on its website and social media, featuring clips from the tournament finals of the 2014 and 2015 editions, accompanied in particular by the hashtag #RolandGarros. The French Tennis Federation (FFT) took legal action against Printemps, alleging infringement of its exclusive exploitation rights, trademark infringement and acts of free riding.

In a judgment dated 12 February 2026, the Paris Judicial Court ruled that the broadcasting of these clips as part of a marketing campaign designed to attract and retain customers of the e-commerce site constituted exploitation of the competition within the meaning of Article L.333-1 of the Sports Code.

The claim of trademark infringement was, however, dismissed, as the disputed hashtag was not used as an indicator of origin, but solely to identify the tournament.

The Court did, however, find that acts of free riding had taken place. It noted that Printemps had disseminated several promotional materials featuring visual elements characteristic of the tournament (clay court, a presenter dressed as a tennis player, balls and rackets, vocabulary drawn from the tennis lexicon) whilst the competition was actually taking place. It concluded from this that the retailer had capitalised on the tournament’s reputation and the promotional investments made by the FFT, in order to profit from them without having paid any consideration.

Printemps was consequently ordered to pay €12,000 for infringement of the right of exploitation and €18,000 in compensation for the damage resulting from acts of free riding.

It is worth noting that Galeries Lafayette has been a partner of Roland-Garros for the past four years.

These decisions illustrate the courts’ vigilance regarding ambush marketing strategies and confirm that the commercial use of a sporting event, even indirectly, may be sanctioned on the basis of the right to exploit sporting events and unfair competition.

Paris Judicial Court, 6 January 2026, No. 23/08148 (FFR v Royaltiz)
Paris Judicial Court, 12 February 2026, No. 23/15958 (FFT v Printemps)

Inadmissibility of an application for revocation of a trademark on the grounds of its connection with pending legal proceedings

By a decision of 30 December 2025, the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) declared an application for revocation of a trademark inadmissible on the grounds that it was connected to a previous legal action for infringement and unfair competition.

In this case, on 20 February 2025, the company Les Grands Chais de France filed an application for revocation on the grounds of lack of genuine use of French trademark No. 1597323, owned by the company MHCS, in respect of certain goods in Class 32. The applicant argued that the trademark had not been put to genuine use in relation to those goods and sought its revocation with effect from 28 December 1996.

However, on 8 January 2025, prior to this application, MHCS had brought proceedings against Les Grands Chais de France before the Paris Judicial Court for trademark infringement, damage to reputation and unfair competition. This action consequently concerned the same trademark and involved the same parties.

Having received the application for revocation, the INPI was therefore required to determine whether it had jurisdiction to rule on the matter, in accordance with Article L.716-5 of the Intellectual Property Code, which in principle confers on the Institute jurisdiction to hear applications for invalidity or revocation, except where these are connected to proceedings before a civil court.

The applicant argued that the connection should be dismissed since the legal action primarily concerned alcoholic beverages in Class 33, in particular champagne, whereas the application for revocation concerned only goods in Class 32, namely non-alcoholic beverages. In his view, the lack of identity between the goods precluded the existence of a sufficiently close link between the two proceedings.

The INPI rejected this argument and, on the contrary, found that there was a connection between the proceedings. It noted, on the one hand, that both proceedings concerned the same trademark and the same parties and, on the other hand, that the application for revocation had been filed after the legal action, which suggests that it forms part of the dispute before the court. The Institute also emphasises that in the summons, the trademark is invoked in its entirety because the goods in question are preceded by the adverb ‘notably’, implying a non-exhaustive list, so that the distinction made by the applicant between goods in classes 32 and 33 is not decisive.

Finally, the INPI notes that the legal action includes a claim based on free riding, linked to the appropriation of the economic value attached to the distinctive colour associated with the trademark. The examination of these allegations necessarily requires an assessment of the sign protected by the trademark, which further strengthens the link between the two proceedings.

In these circumstances, the INPI considers that the application for revocation has sufficiently close links with the pending legal action, justifying that the entire dispute be dealt with by the Courts in the interests of the proper administration of Justice. The Institute therefore declines jurisdiction and rules that the application for revocation is inadmissible. In so doing, the Institute, in a way, anticipates the jurisdiction of the Paris judicial Court over this application for partial revocation of the trademark for lack of genuine use.

This decision illustrates the application of the division of jurisdiction resulting from the reform of trademark law brought about by the PACTE Act. It confirms that the INPI must decline jurisdiction where the administrative application for revocation forms part of an ongoing judicial dispute, even if the goods in question are not strictly identical. The concept of connection is thus interpreted relatively broadly in order to avoid a proliferation of parallel proceedings.

INPI, Decision DC25-0027, 30 December 2025

Withdrawal of the infringement action by the claimant: the defendant may obtain substantial costs under Article 700, even without having filed submissions on the merits:

On 10 August 2023, Labrador Diagnostics LLC brought an infringement action against BioMérieux, based on the French portion of its European patent EP 341. In parallel with these proceedings, the validity of this patent was challenged before the European Patent Office (EPO) in opposition proceedings brought by a third party, in which BioMérieux intervened voluntarily. As the EPO Board of Appeal ultimately revoked the patent, Labrador withdrew its opposition and its infringement action before the French court.

By order of 21 November 2024, the pre-trial judge of the Paris Judicial Court noted this withdrawal and ordered Labrador to pay BioMérieux the sum of €30,000 pursuant to Article 700 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. Considering this compensation insufficient in view of the costs incurred for its defence, BioMérieux lodged an appeal.

In a judgment of 18 February 2026, the Paris Court of Appeal noted that, under Article 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure, ‘unless otherwise agreed, withdrawal entails an undertaking to pay the costs of the discontinued proceedings’, such that a claimant who withdraws must reimburse the costs incurred by the opposing party.

It then clarified that, whilst the application of Article 700 falls within the judge’s discretion, this provision must, in intellectual property matters, be interpreted in the light of Article 14 of Directive 2004/48/EC, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which requires that the successful party be entitled to reimbursement of a “significant and appropriate part of the reasonable costs actually incurred”.

Applying these principles, the Court of Appeal finds that the fees incurred by BioMérieux in conducting its defence in the proceedings initiated by Labrador are justified and proportionate in view of the subject-matter of the dispute and its procedural context, ‘notwithstanding the fact that the pleadings on the merits (…) which were being prepared were not submitted for consideration due to the summary proceedings for withdrawal and the interlocutory proceedings’. Compensation for defence costs is therefore not contingent upon the actual filing of pleadings on the merits, provided that the steps taken are established and useful to the defence.

The Court of Appeal further accepts, in part, the inclusion of the costs incurred by BioMérieux in the proceedings before the EPO. It considers these costs to be ‘directly and closely linked’ to the French infringement proceedings, since the company’s intervention before the EPO took place after the writ of summons was served, was motivated by that action, an expedited procedure had been requested due to the pending litigation before the Paris Judicial Court, and the revocation of the patent led, the very next day, to the claimant’s withdrawal of the proceedings.

Finding that the compensation awarded at first instance was insufficient in view of the costs incurred, the Court set aside the order in so far as it had limited compensation to €30,000 and ordered Labrador Diagnostics LLC to pay BioMérieux the sum of €250,000.

The judgment is of twofold interest. On the one hand, it confirms that, in intellectual property matters, the application of Article 700 must allow for genuine and substantial compensation for the costs reasonably incurred by the successful party, in accordance with the requirements of EU law. Secondly, it clarifies the scope of Article 399 of the code of civil procedure, holding that withdrawal does not preclude compensation for defense costs, including in the absence of submissions on the merits, provided that the steps taken are established and directly linked to the dispute.

Paris Court of Appeal, 18 February 2026, Case No. 25/00501

Infringement proceedings and collective works: the CJEU rules on the requirement to name all co-authors:

In a judgment of 18 December 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled on the compatibility with EU law of a national procedural rule making the admissibility of an action for infringement of the copyright in a collective work conditional upon the inclusion of all co-authors or their successors in title as defendants.

The case concerned several films directed between 1967 and 1974 by Claude Chabrol, some of which were made in collaboration with the screenwriter Paul Gégauff. The exploitation rights to these works had been assigned in 1990 to the company Brinter for a period of thirty years, before being transferred in 2012 to the company Panoceanic Films SA for the films in which Paul Gégauff had participated as an author.

Following the authors’ deaths, their successors in title brought an action concerning, in particular, the validity and scope of this assignment, alleging breaches of contract and infringement of copyright. The defendant companies, however, argued that such an action required the participation of all the co-authors of the films in question or their successors in title. However, due in particular to the age of the works and the difficulties in identifying or locating certain rights holders, it was not possible to bring together all the co-authors.

The Paris Judicial Court, seized of the dispute, referred a question to the CJEU concerning the compatibility with EU law of a national procedural rule based on Article L.113-3 of the French Intellectual Property Code, which makes the admissibility of the action conditional upon all co-owners of the rights in the collaborative work being joined as parties to the proceedings.

In its judgment, the CJEU first notes that Directives 2001/29/EC, 2004/48/EC and 2006/116/EC do not harmonise the procedural rules applicable to infringement actions involving several co-authors. Member States therefore retain procedural autonomy to determine the conditions for the admissibility of such actions.

The CJEU thus held that EU law does not preclude, in principle, a national rule making the admissibility of an infringement action conditional upon the inclusion of all co-rights holders as defendants.

However, it held that such a rule must comply with the principles of effectiveness and equivalence. Where there are objective, serious and persistent difficulties in identifying or locating certain co-authors or their successors in title, such a requirement is likely to render the proceedings ‘excessively difficult or costly’. It is therefore for the national court to ensure that the application of this procedural requirement does not, in practice, render the exercise of copyright impossible or excessively difficult, having regard in particular to the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

CJEU, 18 December 2025, Case C-182/24

Heineken Silver: when “freshness” crosses the red line of the Évin law

On 10 December 2025, the Paris Criminal Court ruled against HEINEKEN and UNIVERSAL, as well as several individuals (influencers), for broadcasting illegal advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages as part of the launch of “Heineken Silver” beer.

Following a complaint by the National Association for the Prevention of Alcoholism and Addiction (ANPAA), the Court ruled that the advertising campaign surrounding the launch of this drink infringed the provisions of the Public Health Code derived from the Évin Law.

The ANPAA accused all of the defendants of having broadcasted, on the occasion of the launch of “Heineken Silver” beer and the temporary event “Heineken Silver Extrafresh Market”, content promoting alcoholic beverages, which it considered unlawful under Articles L.3323-2 and L.3323-4 of the Public Health Code. According to the ANPAA, these publications went beyond the scope of strictly objective information permitted (in particular through the use of vocabulary associated with “freshness”, the staging of “experiences” and a festive atmosphere) and did not include the mandatory health warning on Instagram posts published by natural persons (influencers).

In its ruling, the Court began by pointing out that all online publications must comply with the provisions of the Evin Law, regardless of whether or not they are intended for commercial purposes. It noted that, in this case, the sole purpose of the temporary event “Heineken Silver Extrafresh Market” was to promote the launch of the drink. Therefore, any publication relating to this event was, at the very least, indirect advertising.

However, the Court criticised the press releases mentioning this event for making numerous references to “freshness” (“refreshing mini market”, “extra refreshing lager”) and associating the drink with an attractive environment.

The Court rejected HEINEKEN’s defence argument that “freshness” referred to the method of consumption and held, on the contrary, that in this case “the disputed references […] are not limited to recommending that the beer be consumed cold (in particular through the commonly used phrase ‘best served very cold’) but attribute to it intrinsically this quality of ‘freshness’, adding the superlative ‘extra’, which is devoid of any objectivity“.

With regard to the content posted on Instagram, the Court found a systematic absence of the mandatory health warnings and found that these publications reproduced valorising representations with statements going beyond the exhaustive list provided for in the aforementioned provisions (depictions of smiling consumers in the act of purchasing or consuming, association with a festive moment among friends, captions such as ‘great start to the weekend’, “very nice mini-market”, “I love drinking my little Heineken Silver…”).

On the moral element, the Court points out that the offence is intentional since each of the defendants personally published the disputed content. It adds that they cannot exonerate themselves from liability by invoking ignorance of the law, as the restrictions on their freedom of expression are fully justified by the public health objective pursued by the Evin Law.

In criminal proceedings, HEINEKEN and UNIVERSAL MUSIC France were fined €50,000 and €20,000 respectively, whereas the individual influencers were found guilty but exempted from penalty due to their lack of previous convictions, the removal of the publications and the cessation of the disturbance to public order.

This ruling serves as a reminder that any online publication that directly or indirectly refers to an alcoholic beverage is considered advertising for that beverage and therefore exposes any individual or legal entity to criminal prosecution in the event of illegal advertising. Furthermore, the judgment reminds alcohol producers that communications must be limited to the strictly objective information listed in Article L.3323-4 of the Public Health Code, without resorting to vocabulary that promotes the beverage in any way.

Paris Judicial Court, December 10, 2025

Assessment of inventive step and characterisation of infringement by equivalence of a patent for a therapeutic combination (pemetrexed disodium – vitamin B12):

In a judgment of 17 December 2025, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled on the validity of a patent relating to the use of pemetrexed disodium in combination with vitamin B12, as well as on its infringement by equivalence by a generic medicine.

In this case, Eli Lilly and Company brought an infringement action on the basis of its European patent EP 1 313 508, relating to the use of pemetrexed disodium in the treatment of certain cancers in combination with vitamin B12 in order to limit the toxicity of the treatment without impairing its therapeutic efficacy. The action was brought against Viatris Santé, which markets a generic pemetrexed-based medicine in the form of pemetrexed diarginine, intended for administration with vitamin B12 and folic acid. In response, Viatris Santé filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration of invalidity of the patent.

In a judgment of 20 October 2023, the Paris Judicial Court had essentially upheld the patent, found infringement and dismissed the claims based on unfair competition.

On appeal, the Court had to rule on the validity of the patent with regard to inventive step and the sufficiency of disclosure, as well as on infringement and unfair competition.

With regard to inventive step, the Court of Appeal noted that an invention must not be obvious to a person skilled in the art, defined as a team comprising an oncologist and a pharmacologist. It noted that the documents cited established neither a correlation between the toxicity of pemetrexed and elevated homocysteine levels, nor a recommendation to use vitamin B12 supplementation. As the claimed solution did not follow obviously from the prior art, the patent was therefore deemed to involve an inventive step.

On the issue of sufficiency of disclosure, the Court of Appeal overturned the Paris Judicial Court’s decision to invalidate claims 12 to 14. It held that the term ‘product containing’ refers to a combined preparation of distinct compounds (disodium pemetrexed, vitamin B12 and possibly folic acid) administered in a coordinated manner, which enables a person skilled in the art to carry out the invention.

Regarding infringement, the Court of Appeal recalls that this is established where the essential features of the invention are reproduced. It observes that the generic medicine, although formulated as pemetrexed diarginine, is based on the same active ingredient and is administered in combination with vitamin B12 and folic acid. The difference relating to the nature of the salt is deemed irrelevant, as the cations (sodium or arginine) have no bearing on either therapeutic efficacy or side effects, the active component being solely the pemetrexed anion. Consequently, the essential features of the invention are reproduced, and infringement is therefore established.

This judgment highlights that secondary chemical modifications are irrelevant to the characterisation of infringement by equivalence, provided that the essential features of the invention are reproduced.

Finally, the Court of Appeal dismissed the claim of unfair competition, as Lilly France failed to prove that it was an authorised distributor or that it had suffered any damage in connection with the acts alleged.

Paris Court of Appeal, 17 December 2025, No. 24/02201